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I. INTRODUCTION
The Zimbabwean parliament passed two amendments to the Constitution of Zimbabwe on April
19, 2000 (Amendment 16)1 and on September 14, 2005 (Amendment 17),2 authorizing the
seizure of white-owned farmlands without compensation. Since 2000, the Zimbabwean
government has expropriated a string of white-owned commercial lands without compensation.3
In March 2008, in a consolidated case (Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v Zimbabwe),4 79
applicants filed an application with the Southern African Development Community Tribunal
(SADC Tribunal) to challenge the legality of the acquisition of certain agricultural lands by the
Zimbabwean government. On November 28, 2008, the Tribunal ruled that the expropriations of
agricultural lands by the Zimbabwean government were illegal because they were based on racial
discrimination and did not compensate the applicants.
This paper seeks to understand the contribution that the Campbell case brings to the law on
foreign direct investment, especially the principle that expropriations must not be discriminatory.
Investment law generally prohibits discriminatory expropriations or nationalizations on the basis
of race, with the notable exception of post-colonial expropriations carried out to end the
economic domination of the nationals of the former colonial power.5 By declaring that the
1

Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment No. 16, Act 5 of 2000. [hereinafter Amendment 16].

2

Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment No. 17, Act 5 of 2005. [hereinafter Amendment 17].

3

Constitution of Zimbabwe § 16A(1) [hereinafter Zimbabwean Constitution]: ‘In regard to the compulsory
acquisition of agricultural land for the resettlement of people in accordance with a programme of land
reform, the following factors shall be regarded as of ultimate and overriding importance
(a) under colonial domination the people of Zimbabwe were unjustifiably dispossessed of their land and
other resources without compensation;

(b) the people consequently took up arms in order to regain their land and political sovereignty, and this
ultimately resulted in the Independence of Zimbabwe in 1980;
(c) the people of Zimbabwe must be enabled to reassert their rights and regain ownership of their land;
and accordingly—
(i) the former colonial power has an obligation to pay compensation for agricultural land compulsorily
acquired for resettlement, through an adequate fund established for the purpose; and
(ii) if the former colonial power fails to pay compensation through such a fund, the Government of
Zimbabwe has no obligation to pay compensation for agricultural land compulsorily acquired for
resettlement.’
4

Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd. and Others v. The Republic of Zimbabwe, SADC (T) Case No. 2/2007. [Hereinafter
Campbell].

5

M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 398 (Cambridge University Press 2004).
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expropriations of white-owned agricultural lands in Zimbabwe were illegal because they
amounted to racial discrimination,6 the SADC Tribunal in Campbell appears to develop the
investment law jurisprudence on expropriations by creating an exception to the exception.
Accordingly, the question that this paper addresses centers on the extent to which a country can
expropriate property as part of a general government program to correct present economic
inequalities brought about by a colonial past.
The paper starts with a presentation of the legal position on expropriations from an investment
law vantage point and, more specifically, on the requirements that expropriations must not be
discriminatory and that they must be for a public purpose. The paper continues with a brief of the
Campbell case and an explanation of the contribution, if any, that the case makes to the
jurisprudence on expropriations. The paper ends by concluding, in light of the foregoing
discussion, whether the SADC Tribunal rightly decided the Campbell case and, if not, how the
case could and should have been decided.

II. EXPROPRIATIONS IN INVESTMENT LAW

A. APPLICATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW TO CAMPBELL
To understand the change that Campbell may have brought about in foreign investment law, it is
first necessary to verify that foreign investment law applies to the case. To start with, the SADC
Tribunal is an international court tasked with the duty to develop SADC jurisprudence having
regard to applicable treaties, public international law and any rules and principles of the law of
the 15 SADC states.7 In Campbell, the SADC Tribunal used an international human rights law
approach and not an investment law approach, though nothing forbade nor obliged it to apply
investment law.
Foreign investment law applies to Campbell because of the foreign nationality or British origins
of the investors in some of the Zimbabwean corporations whose lands were expropriated.8 In
Funnekotter v. Zimbabwe, a case involving Amendment 17 and the expropriations of white6

Campbell, supra note 4, at 53.

7

Protocol on Tribunal in the Southern African Development Community art. 21(b). [hereinafter SADC Tribunal
Protocol].

8

In Campbell, 28 private companies registered in Zimbabwe were among the Applicants.
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owned agricultural lands in Zimbabwe, the claimants were variously of Dutch and Italian
nationalities9 and they claimed that the Zimbabwean government violated a bilateral investment
treaty (BIT) between the Netherlands and Zimbabwe.10 Finally, the settlement of the
Funnekotter dispute by the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) is evidence of the application of foreign investment law. It follows from the foregoing
that the changes or contribution that the Campbell case may have wrought on the international
law of expropriations applies to foreign investment law as well.

B. BASIC DISTINCTIONS
Sornarajah, a leading foreign investment scholar and a professor at the National University of
Singapore, distinguishes between three types of takings which are often used interchangeably,
namely confiscation, expropriation, and nationalization.11 He states that ‘confiscation’ is the
capricious taking of property by the rulers of the state for personal gain. ‘Expropriation’ (or
‘compulsory acquisition’ as it is termed in the Zimbabwean Constitution) refers to the taking by
states for an economic or public purpose whereas ‘nationalization’ refers to the across-the-board
takings designed to end or diminish foreign investment in the economy or in sectors of the
economy.12
From Sornarajah’s basic distinctions of takings, it is evident that the fundamental issue in
Campbell is not whether compulsory takings of commercial farms in Zimbabwe constitute illegal
expropriations, as the SADC Tribunal and the parties frame it. Rather, the real dilemma is
whether the compulsory takings amount to confiscations or nationalizations.
Sornarajah’s basic distinctions between the different meanings of takings by the state also reveal
that, given the across-the-board scale of takings in the agricultural sector in Zimbabwe since
2000, it would be more accurate to characterize the Zimbabwean land redistribution measures as
nationalization rather than expropriations. The legal implications of both nationalizations and
expropriations are the same in a relevant respect: They both trigger compensation mechanisms.
Nevertheless, nationalizations and expropriations have different impacts: Unlike expropriations,
nationalizations can be crippling and devastating for a host country’s economy, as is the case for
9

Bernardus Henricus Funnekotter and Others v. Republic of Zimbabwe, (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/6) at ¶ 1
[hereinafter Funnekotter].

10

Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments Between the Republic of Zimbabwe and
the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Dec. 11, 1996.
11

M. SORNARAJAH, supra note 5, at 345ff; see also PAUL E. COMEAUX & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, PROTECTING
FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW: LEGAL ASPECTS OF POLITICAL RISK 3 (Oceana Publications 1997).
12

M. SORNARAJAH, supra note 5, at 346.
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Zimbabwe.13 The nationalization that started in 2000, after the rejection of President Robert
Mugabe’s constitutional referendum,14 resulted in Zimbabwe beating world economic records
(highest inflation rate, smallest domestic market size, and lowest foreign direct investment).15

C. EXPROPRIATIONS
Expropriations are ‘the most severe form of interference with property,’16 even though they are
prima facie lawful.17 States enjoy the right to expropriate or the ‘the right of eminent domain’,
which is an entitlement that emanates from the states’ territorial sovereignty.18 Foreign
investment law says that expropriations or nationalizations constitute a political, non-commercial
risk that can be insured against by dint of insurance guarantees from national investment
insurance agencies or the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). In
foreign investment law, a ‘political risk’ is a risk faced by an investor that a host country will
confiscate all or a portion of the investor’s property rights located in the host country.19
Nonetheless, the sovereign power of states to expropriate property is not unfettered or boundless.
States trade credibility for sovereignty, as foreign investment law not only restricts regulatory
conduct of states to an unusual extent but also subjects it to control through compulsory
international adjudication mechanisms,20 such as the ICSID and the SADC Tribunal. In
particular, the power of states to expropriate is circumscribed by the requirements that the
13

It is estimated that in 2005 the unemployment rate in Zimbabwe was in excess of 80% and in 2008 the gross
domestic product (GDP) growth rate in Zimbabwe was -12.6%: Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook
2009: Zimbabwe, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ZI.html. Moreover, the
compulsory acquisition of agricultural lands caused a steep decline in agricultural exports and shortages in hardcurrency, which in turn caused hyperinflation and chronic shortages in imported fuel, food and consumer goods. See
Human Rights Watch, Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Mar. 2002, vol. 14 no. 1 (A).
14

Mugabe Accepts Referendum Defeat, BBC AFRICA, Feb. 15, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/644168.stm.
(reporting that voters in Zimbabwe rejected a constitution proposal to consolidate presidential powers and allow the
government to confiscate white-owned land for redistribution to black farmers without compensation).
15

WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM ET AL., THE AFRICA COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2009 237 (World Economic Forum
2009).

16

RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 89 (Oxford
University Press 2008).

17

M. SORNARAJAH, supra note 5, at 395.

18

RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, supra note 16, at 89.

19

PAUL E. COMEAUX & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, supra note 11, at 1.

20

Anne van Aaken, International Investment Law Between Commitment and Flexibility, 12 J. INT'L ECON.
L. 507, 509 (2009).
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expropriation serve a public purpose and that the state compensate individuals aggrieved by
expropriation. Apart from scaring away foreign investment, a policy that would permit states to
take property without restrictions would increase the costs of doing business in those states, like
it did in Zimbabwe.21 Such a policy would also reduce the incentive of states to be careful about
what they take and would dilute drastically the very idea of property ownership.22
The fundamental rule of English law that property could be taken only for a public purpose and
on payment of compensation settled in the written constitutions of most Commonwealth states23
such as Zimbabwe,24 Botswana, Zambia and Malawi. When compensation follows a taking by
the state, expropriations or nationalizations amount to forced sales.25 When, on the other hand,
no compensation is paid for expropriations or nationalizations, the taking amount to a
confiscation, as the author submits later in this paper.
Therefore, for an expropriation to be legal in international law, it has to comply with the
following requirements:
- It must be for a public purpose;
- it must not be discriminatory; and
- the state must pay compensation for expropriation.
These requirements form part of customary international law and must be met cumulatively,26
which means that, if any of those requirements is violated, there is a violation of customary
international law. Accordingly, the SADC Tribunal in Campbell sat to determine whether the
government of Zimbabwe had complied with these three conditions. However, for the purposes
of this paper, the next sections zero in on the public purpose and non-discrimination
requirements.

21

The Africa Competitiveness Report 2009 (WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM ET AL., supra note 15, at 237) suggests that
Zimbabwe is one of Africa’s least competitive country.
22

See JEFFREY L. HARRISON & JULES THEEUWES, LAW AND ECONOMICS 102-103 (W.W. Norton & Company 2008).
The Africa Competitiveness Report 2009 (WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM ET AL., supra note 14, at 237) also states that
Zimbabwe has the weakest property rights protection system.

23

TOM ALLEN, THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY IN COMMONWEALTH CONSTITUTIONS 36 (Cambridge University Press
2000).

24

In 2002, the Commonwealth of Nations suspended Zimbabwe from membership following abuses committed
during the land redistribution and the elections in the early 2000s.
25

JEFFREY L. HARRISON & JULES THEEUWES, supra note 22, at 108.

26

RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, supra note 16, at 91.
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III. REQUIREMENTS FOR LAWFUL EXPROPRIATIONS

A. PUBLIC PURPOSE

1. THE DOCTRINE

The first requirement for a lawful expropriation is that it must be for a public purpose.27 Thus,
while the compensation requirement makes an expropriation that is non-discriminatory and for a
public purpose conditionally legal, an expropriation that is discriminatory or not for a public
purpose is illegal in itself, whether or not compensation is paid.28 In Certain German Interests in
the Polish Upper Silesia, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) defined ‘public
purpose’ as ‘reasons of public utility, judicial liquidation and similar measures’.29 The doctrine
probably originates from the statement by Hugo Grotius of public purpose as a limitation on the
powers of eminent domain.30
2. THE UNCERTAIN STATUS OF THE DOCTRINE

It is still uncertain whether ‘public purpose’ is a requirement for lawful expropriations. Even
though ‘public purpose’ is, on a preponderance of authorities, a requirement for lawful
expropriation,31 some still maintain that ‘public purpose’ is not so much of a limitation today,32
others go as far as declaring that it is not a requirement at all.33 Earlier authors tend to favor the
27

Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N. Doc.A/5217 (Dec.
14,1962) ¶ 4: ‘Nationalization, expropriation or requisition shall be based on grounds or reasons of public
utility, security, or the national interest which are recognized as overriding purely individual or private
interests, both domestic and foreign;’ Texaco v. Libya (1977) 53 I.L.R. 389.
28

PAUL E. COMEAUX & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, supra note 11, at 78.

29

Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia,1926 P.C.I.J., Series A., No. 7, p.22.

30

M. SORNARAJAH, supra note 5, at 396.

31

See Sabbatino v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, (1961) 193 F. Supp. 375 at 384 (held, that a nationalization in Cuba
was invalid for want of a public purpose).
32
33

M. SORNARAJAH, supra note 5, at 395.

See Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO) v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 63 I.L.R. 140 (1977)
at 194: ‘As to the contention that the said measures were politically motivated and not in pursuance of a legitimate
public purpose, it is the general opinion in international theory that the public utility principle is not a necessary
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public purpose doctrine34 whereas modern authors tend to disfavor it.35 The author’s position in
this debate is that one cannot meaningfully conceive of ‘expropriation’ without ‘public purpose’
for the simple reason that the definition of ‘expropriation’ subsumes ‘public purpose’. In other
words, a taking would not even qualify as an expropriation if it is not for a public purpose. It
therefore makes more logical sense to say that ‘public purpose’ is one of the elements definitive
of an expropriation rather than a requirement for lawful expropriations.

3. THE DOCTRINE IN PRACTICE
Very few cases revolve on the question as to whether an expropriation is for a public purpose
and those that do indeed address the question usually play down the significance of the public
purpose doctrine. In James v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights declared
that:36
The Court, finding it natural that the margin of appreciation available to the legislature in
implementing social and economic policies should be a wide one, will respect the
legislature’s judgment as to what is ‘in the public interest’ unless the judgment be
manifestly without reasonable foundation.
The small number of cases on the substance of ‘public purpose’ may be imputable to the fact that
an expropriating state can effortlessly couch any taking in terms of some ‘public purpose’.37 In
Campbell, the government of Zimbabwe had formulated the taking of white-owned commercial

requisite for the legality of a nationalization;’ Shufeldt Claim (1930) U.N.R.I.A.A. 1079 at 1095: ‘[I]t is perfectly
competent for the Government of Guatemala to enact any decree they like and for any reasons they see fit, and such
reasons are no concern of the Tribunal;’ Oscar Chinn Case (1934) PCfJ Series A/B, No. 63 at 79 (held, that the
Belgian state was ‘the sole judge’ of the situation).
34

B.A. WORTLEY, EXPROPRIATIONS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 24-25 (The University Press 1959); McNair,
The Seizure of Property and Enterprises in Indonesia, 6 NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REV. 218, 243 (1959).
35

M. SORNARAJAH, supra note 5, at 395; GILLIAN WHITE, NATIONALISATION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY 150 (Stevens &
Sons, Ltd. 1961); SAMY FRIEDMAN, EXPROPRIATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (CONTRIBUTIONS IN COMPARATIVE
COLONIAL STUDIES) 142 (Greenwood Press 1981); C.F. AMERASINGHE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO
ALIENS 138 (Oxford University Press 1967).
36

James v. United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 123.

37

M. SORNARAJAH, supra note 5, at 395ff; RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, supra note 16, at 91.
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farms in terms of ‘land resettlement purposes,’38 which is without a doubt a legitimate
government purpose.39
Foreign investors seldom argue that a host state has not fulfilled the public purpose requirement
for at least three possible reasons. First, the determination of what constitutes ‘public purpose’ is
a political one40 and, as stated in the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States,
it is not subject to ‘effective re-examination by other states.’41 An international forum like the
SADC Tribunal would be none the more effective in the re-examination exercise. Second,
though a few arbitral tribunals elaborated on the significance of the public purpose
requirement,42 the concept of ‘public purpose’ is generally regarded as broad, vague and
ambiguous. Third, state regulation of private property is such a daily feature of national life that
it is harder and harder for courts and tribunals outside the state to sit in judgment of the motives
behind the takings by the state.43
Despite the uncertainty as to its nature, the public purpose doctrine is frequently (re)affirmed in
virtually all BITs and in the practice of states. Even in article 16 of the Lancaster House
Constitution44 that ended colonial rule in Rhodesia,45 the circumstances under which the state
could compulsorily acquire property in the public interest were clearly defined,46 but the
parliament amended article 16 twice.47 Sornarajah believes that the recurrent reference to the
public purpose doctrine may be due to the ‘compulsion to follow a time-tested formula rather
than to any conviction that the requirement continues to have any force.’48

38

Amendment 17 § 16B(2).

39

See e.g. S.K. Amoo, The Exercise of the Rights of Sovereignty and the Laws of Expropriation of Namibia, South
Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe, in THE CONSTITUTION AT WORK: 10 YEARS OF NAMIBIAN NATIONHOOD 256, 262
(Manfred O. Hinz et al. eds., 2002): ‘In the context of the constitutional and political history of Namibia, land
resettlement and agrarian reform will legitimately come within the definition of public interest.’ Emphasis added.
40

Id. at 265.

41

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW art. 712(1)(a) (1987).

42

RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, supra note 16, at 91.

43

M. SORNARAJAH, supra note 5, at 396-97.

44

The Lancaster House Constitution refers to the Zimbabwean Constitution as adopted at Independence in 1981.
Since then, the Zimbabwean government has amended the Constitution several times.
45

Rhodesia was the name of the formerly British colony of Southern Rhodesia, today’s Zimbabwe, that declared
itself independent on 11 November 1965. The international community never recognized Rhodesia, whose
governments were dominated by white minorities.
46

Zimbabwean Constitution § 16(1)(a).

47

Amendment 16 in 2000; and Amendment 17 in 2005.

48

M. SORNARAJAH, supra note 5, at 396.
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This section has demonstrated that the requirement that expropriation be for a public purpose is
not so much of a restriction on expropriations. The succeeding section immediately turns to the
analysis of the non-discrimination requirement.
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B. DISCRIMINATORY EXPROPRIATIONS

1. DISCRIMINATION

From an extensive body of jurisprudence, it appears that discrimination may be defined by
employing three equations. Discrimination has been equated with action:49
(a) motivated by prejudice or ‘discriminatory intent’;
(b) motivated by factors other than prejudice; or
(c) which have the effect of disproportionately disadvantaging a particular group defined by
sex or race, yet which cannot be justified by other countervailing considerations (the
‘disparate impact’ theory of discrimination).50
Though the Campbell case features all three conceptions of discrimination, the ‘disparate impact’
meaning of discrimination (i.e. indirect discrimination) dominates and determines the case, as the
paper shows below.

2. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

Even a furtive look at any major dictionary reveals that ‘race’ is a notion that does not easily lend
itself to any simple or simplistic explanation,51 not to mention the inescapable tautologies that

49

CHRISTOPHER MCCRUDDEN, ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW xiv ff (Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited 1991).

50

In South Africa, when courts consider an equality claim the primary issue is the impact of the discrimination, and
not whether it treats different groups identically: Sandra Liebenberg & Michelle O’Sullivan, South Africa’s New
Equality Legislation: A Tool for Advancing Women’s Socio-economic Equality, in EQUALITY LAW: REFLECTIONS
FROM SOUTH AFRICA AND ELSEWHERE 70, 78 (Saras Jagwanth & Evance Kalula eds., 2001). See also NIHAL
JAYAWICKRAMA, THE JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE 177 (Cambridge University Press 2002); SHADRACK B.O. GUTTO, EQUALITY AND NONDISCRIMINATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAW AND LAW-MAKING 127 (New Africa Books
(Pty) Ltd. 2001).
51

THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 742 (4ed. 2006) defines ‘race’ as:

1. each of the major divisions of humankind, based on particular physical characteristics;
2. racial origin or the qualities associated with this;
3. a group of people sharing the same culture or language; or
4. a group of people or things with a common feature.
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such explanations would entail. Part of the conceptual difficulty is due to the fact that ‘race’ is
not essential but socially constructed.52
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) provides an
authoritative legal definition of ‘racial discrimination’. Article 1 of CERD is a useful attempt to
stabilize the meaning of ‘racial discrimination’, which it defines as:
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, color, descent, or
natural or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.
Since the SADC Treaty does not define the phrase, the SADC Tribunal and other SADC
institutions must consider the definition of ‘racial discrimination’ in CERD.

3. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW

A racially discriminatory taking is a violation of international law. The principle against racial
discrimination and the principle of non-discrimination in general are well-established norms of
international law. Effectively, racial discrimination is castigated by the main international legal
instruments, including the CERD,53 the Charter of the United Nations,54 the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),55 the United Nations (UN) Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (CCPR),56 the UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(CESCR).57 Furthermore, like the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)58 and the
52

See United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, preamble, Mar. 7,
1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. [hereinafter CERD]: ‘…any doctrine of superiority based on racial differentiation is
scientifically false...’
53

CERD art. 1.

54

United Nations, Charter of the United Nations art. 1(3), Oct. 24, 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI. [hereinafter UN Charter].

55

United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 2, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. G.A.O.R., 3d
st
Sess., 1 plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). [hereinafter UDHR].
56

United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
[hereinafter CCPR].
57

United Nations Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 2(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 993,
U.N.T.S. 3. [hereinafter CESCR].
58

Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 14, 213
U.N.T.S. 222.
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American Convention on Human Rights,59 the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(African Charter) proscribes racial discrimination.60
The status of the principle against racial discrimination as a peremptory norm of international
law is unclear and debatable. Some legal scholars suggest that there is widespread support to
elevate anti-discrimination (including anti-apartheid) to the status of ius cogens norm, from
which no derogation is permitted.61 Other scholars claim that racial discrimination is already a
ius cogens principle.62
The Southern African Development Community (SADC),63 the regional economic community of
Southern Africa, has an equivalent anti-discrimination provision in its constitution, the SADC
Treaty.64 Article 6(2) of the SADC Treaty ordains that:65
SADC and member states shall not discriminate against any person on grounds of gender,
religion, political views, race, ethnic origin, culture, ill health, disability or such other
ground as may be determined by the Summit.
Article 6(2) of the SADC Treaty is the applicable and most relevant provision in the Campbell
case. More precisely, the legal question in the case was whether the government of Zimbabwe
had violated article 6(2) of the SADC Treaty by enacting and implementing Amendment 17.

4. REMEDYING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

Litigation, enforcement by a regulatory agency, and contract compliance are the three main
institutions for the redress of discrimination.66 Two other remedies may be mentioned, namely
59

Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 1(1). Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S.
No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
60

Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 2, June 27, 1981,

21 I.L.M. 58 (1982). [hereinafter African Charter].
61

JOHN DUGARD, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 43 (Juta & Co., Ltd. 2005).

62

M. SORNARAJAH, supra note 5, at 398.

63

SADC is a 15-member regional economic community. SADC member states are Angola, Botswana, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia,
Seychelles, South Africa, the Kingdom of Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. SADC welcomed back
Seychelles at the 28th SADC Heads of State and Government Summit in August 2008.
64

Southern African Development Community, Treaty of the Southern African Development Community,
Aug. 17 1992, 32 I.L.M. 116 [hereinafter SADC Treaty].
65

Id. Emphasis added.
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providing a monetary substitute for a lost opportunity and requiring a re-run of the occasion,
minus the discrimination.
By far the most popular way of remedying instances of discrimination is by advancing members
of a historically disadvantaged group, such as blacks and women. It is a method widely known as
‘affirmative action’ in most countries in the world and as ‘positive action’ in the United
Kingdom (UK). Certainly, Amendment 17 is on its surface aimed at advancing Black
Zimbabweans. Since the white settlers themselves ‘expropriated’ the lands of Black
Zimbabweans before the country’s Independence from the UK on April 18, 1980, Amendment
17 sets out to even out the economic imbalances that colonialism created by expropriating lands
acquired during the colonial days. Such provisions lay bare the homeopathic paradox of
reversing past structural discrimination by present structural discrimination.

5. EXCEPTIONS TO RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN INVESTMENT LAW

Either as an end in itself or as a means to an end, anti-discrimination is not absolute. It is limited
by its own purposes or by a meta-principle such as substantive equality, often in the form of
affirmation action. Thus, post-colonial expropriations carried out to end the economic
domination of the nationals of the former colonial power are an exception to the general
prohibition on racial discrimination in foreign investment law.67
Non-discrimination or anti-discrimination can be seen in two basic ways: Either as an end in
itself or as a means to an end.68 With the first alternative, anti-discrimination is a principle worth
supporting in its own right and one which attempts to advance a goal different from other goals
such as justice and equality.69 However, this is a limited principle and it is limited in scope by the
very goal which it is advancing. With the second alternative, on the other hand, antidiscrimination is a mediating principle, a partial translation of another principle such as
substantive equality and justice.70 Here, anti-discrimination is open-ended, ambiguous or
standardless, and thus in need of interpretation in light of the other principle (‘the metaprinciple’) on which it is based.71

66

CHRISTOPHER MCCRUDDEN, supra note 48, at xxviff.

67

M. SORNARAJAH, supra note 5, at 398.

68

CHRISTOPHER MCCRUDDEN, supra note 48, at xviii.

69

Id.

70

Id.

71

Id.
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With either alternative, post-colonial expropriations to reverse the adverse economic legacies of
colonialism are in principle legitimate and lawful. Following the comparatively recent accession
to political independence by the Black majority in Zimbabwe (1980),72 Namibia (1990), and
South Africa (1994), the constitutions of Zimbabwe,73 Namibia74 and South Africa75 subject
equality to affirmative action. Affirmative action animates and inspires their respective land
redistribution programs, which all aim to rectify the economic ills of apartheid and colonialism.
Similarly, the constitutions of Zimbabwe76 and South Africa77 subordinate the right to private
property to the government power to expropriate property for land redistribution purposes.
However, depending on whether one assumes the peremptory nature of the principle against
racial discrimination, exceptions to the general prohibition on racial discrimination violate
international law as ius cogens norms are by definition non-derogable. David Schneiderman even
noticed that international investment law may be counter-majoritarian and side against public
purpose as investment rules can be viewed as a set of binding constraints designed to insulate
economic policy from majoritarian politics.78

72

The Constitution of Zimbabwe was published as a Schedule to the Zimbabwe Constitution Order 1979 (S.I.
1979/1600 of the United Kingdom).
73

Constitution of Zimbabwe § 23(3)(g): ‘Nothing contained in any law shall be held to be a contravention
of [the provision prohibiting discrimination] to the extent that the law in question relates to…the
implementation of affirmation action programmes for the protection or advancement of persons or classes
of persons who have been previously disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.’
74

Constitution of Namibia art. 23(2), Act 1 of 1990. [hereinafter Namibian Constitution]: ‘Nothing contained in [the
article providing for the right to equality in the Namibian Constitution] shall prevent Parliament from enacting
legislation providing directly or indirectly for the advancement of persons within Namibia who have been socially,
economically or educationally disadvantaged by past discriminatory laws or practices, or for the implementation of
policies and programmes aimed at redressing social, economic or educational imbalances in the Namibian society
arising out of past discriminatory laws or practices…’
75

Constitution of South Africa § 9(2), Act 108 of 1996. [hereinafter South African Constitution]: ‘…To promote the
achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of
persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.’
76

Amendment 17 § 16B(2).

77

South African Constitution § 26(4),(6),(7),(8) and (9). In particular § 26(8): ‘No provision of this section may
impede the state from taking legislative and other measures to achieve land, water and related reform, in order to
redress the results of past racial discrimination…’ Emphasis added.
78

DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: INVESTMENT RULES AND
DEMOCRACY’S PROMISE 3 (Cambridge University Press 2008).
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IV. CAMPBELL V. ZIMBABWE

A. THE CASE

1. CORE ISSUES

The questions of law in Campbell v. Zimbabwe are:79 (1) Whether the SADC Tribunal had
jurisdiction to entertain the application; (2) whether or not the Applicants had been denied access
to the courts in Zimbabwe (i.e. the Respondent); (3) whether or not the Applicants had been
discriminated against on the basis of race, and (4) whether or not compensation is payable for the
lands compulsory acquired from the Applicants by Zimbabwe. This paper, however, only
focuses on the issue of racial discrimination.

2. FACTS

On September 14, 2005, the Zimbabwean parliament passed an amendment to the Constitution
of Zimbabwe (Amendment 17). Section 16B(2) of Amendment 17 read in relevant part:
‘(a) all agricultural land … [reference to national gazettes where specific agricultural
lands for resettlement purposes are identified]…is acquired by and vested in the State
with full title therein with effect from the appointed day or, in the case of land referred to
in subparagraph (iii), with effect from the date it is identified in the manner specified in
that paragraph; and
(b) no compensation shall be payable for land referred to in paragraph (a) except for any
improvements effected on such land before it was acquired’.
Following Amendment 17, the Zimbabwean state expropriated a number of white-owned
agricultural lands. Mike Campbell (Pvt) Limited, a Zimbabwean registered company, and
William Michael Campbell commenced legal action in the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, the
country’s highest court, challenging the acquisition of their land by the state.80 Concurrently, on
79
80

Campbell, supra note 4, at 16-17.

Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd. et al. v. The Minister of National Security Responsible for Land, Land Reform and
Resettlement and the Attorney-General (SC 49/07)(2007).
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October 11, 2007, the two Applicants filed an application with the SADC Tribunal challenging
the taking by the state of their agricultural land as well as applying for interim measures in terms
of article 28 of the Tribunal Protocol.81 On December 13, 2007, the SADC Tribunal granted the
interim measure, which ordered Zimbabwe to refrain from taking any step or permitting any step,
directly and indirectly, to interfere with the peaceful residence on, and beneficial use of, the land
in question.82 On February 22, 2008, however, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe dismissed the
two Applicants’ claims entirely.83
Later, 77 other persons applied to intervene in the proceedings and applied to the Tribunal for
interim measures, which the Tribunal both granted.84 The Mike Campbell (Pvt) Limited and
William Michael Campbell case and the cases of the 77 other Applicants were then consolidated
into one case. Though the main hearing was set for May 28, 2008, it was postponed until 16 July.
However, between these two dates, Michael Campbell, 76, one of the two early Applicants, and
his family were brutally beaten up on their farm in Zimbabwe and allegedly forced to sign a
paper declaring that they would withdraw the case from the SADC Tribunal.85 On June 20, 2008,
the Applicants referred to the Tribunal the failure by Zimbabwe to comply with the Tribunal’s
decision regarding the interim reliefs. Yet, after 28 November 2008, when the SADC Tribunal
decided for Campbell, his home of 50 years was burnt to the ground by farm invaders in
September 2009.86

3. PARTIES’ SUBMISSIONS

81

Protocol on Tribunal in the Southern African Development Community [hereinafter SADC Protocol].

82

Mike Campbell (Pvt) Limited and Another v. The Republic of Zimbabwe, Case No. SADCT 2/07 at 8.

83

Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd. et al. v. The Minister of National Security Responsible for Land, Land Reform and
Resettlement and the Attorney-General, supra note 80.
84

Gideon Stephanus Theron v. The Republic of Zimbabwe and Others, Case No. SADC (T) 2/08; Douglas Stuart
Taylor-Freeme and Others v. The Republic of Zimbabwe and Others, Case No. SADC (T) 03/08; Andrew Paul
Rosslyn Stidolph and Others v. The Republic of Zimbabwe and Others, Case No. SADC (T) 04/08; Anglesea Farm
(Pvt) Ltd. and Others v. The Republic of Zimbabwe and Another, Case No. SADC (T) 06/08.
85

Oliver C. Ruppel & Francois X. Bangamwabo, The SADC Tribunal: A Legal Analysis of its Mandate and Role in
Regional Integration, in MONITORING REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA YEARBOOK 2008 7 (Namibian
Economic Policy Research Unit 2008).
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The Applicants were represented by one Namibian lawyer87 and three eminent and senior
advocates from South African, 88 Zimbabwean89 and English90 bars. On the Respondent’s side,
the government of Zimbabwe was represented by its deputy Attorney-General91 and chief law
officer.92
The Applicants deployed several arguments to buttress their main contention that Zimbabwe is in
breach of article 6(2) of the SADC Treaty, prohibiting racial discrimination, by enacting and
implementing Amendment 17. First, they submitted that expropriations, carried out pursuant to
Amendment 17, were based solely or primarily on consideration of race and ethnic origin, that
they are directed at white farmers, whether or not white farmers acquired the land during the
colonial period or after Independence. The Applicants further argued that, even if Amendment
17 made no reference to the race and color of the owners of the land expropriated, its legislative
intent is clearly directed only at white farmers and has apparently no other rational
categorization. Finally, they contended that the government of Zimbabwe expropriated the
targeted farms and distributed them to certain senior political, judicial or military officers
politically connected to the government.
In reply to the Applicants’ submissions that Amendment 17 violated article 6(2) of the SADC
Treaty, the government of Zimbabwe denied that its land reform program targeted white farmers
only. It explained that the program is for the benefit of the people who were disadvantaged under
colonialism and it is within this context that the Applicants’ farms were identified for acquisition
by the Zimbabwean government. The farms expropriated were suitable for agricultural purposes
and happen to be largely owned by the white Zimbabweans, who are inevitably the people most
likely to be affected by the expropriations. According to the Zimbabwean government, such
expropriation of land under the program cannot be attributed to racism but circumstances
brought about by colonial history. And, contrary to the submissions by the Applicants, not only
lands belonging to white Zimbabweans have been expropriated, but also those of the few black
Zimbabweans who possessed large tracts of land.

87

Elize M. Angula.

88

Jeremy J. Gauntlett, SC.

89

Adrian Phillip de Bourbon, SC.

90

Jeffrey L. Jowell, QC.

91

P. Machaya.
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Nelson Mutsonzwa.
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4. HOLDINGS

The main hearings took place in July 2008 before the SADC Tribunal at its official seat in
Windhoek, the capital city of Namibia. It was a five-member bench,93 consisting of Isaac
Mtambo (Malawi), Luis Mondlane (Mozambique), Dr. Rigoberto Kambovo (Angola), Dr.
Onkemetse Tshosa (Botswana) and, as President of the Tribunal, Ariranga Pillay (Mauritius).
Justice Mondlane delivered the majority judgment whereas Justice Tshosa handed down a brief
dissenting opinion on the issue of racial discrimination.94
From the outset, the SADC Tribunal noted that discrimination of whatever nature is outlawed or
prohibited in international law.95 The Tribunal cited to several provisions in international legal
instruments that prohibit discrimination based on race.96 It then proceeded to define racial
discrimination, noting that the SADC Treaty neither defines racial discrimination nor offers any
guidelines to that effect.97 The Tribunal reviewed the provisions of the CERD, the CCPR, and
the CESCR.98 In the process, it distinguished between formal and substantive equality,99 on the
one hand, and between direct and indirect discrimination,100 on the other.
After it addressed the definition of ‘racial discrimination’, the Tribunal moved on to determine
whether Amendment 17 fit that definition. It first observed that Amendment 17 affected all
agricultural lands or farms occupied by the Applicants and that the Applicants are white
farmers.101 It held that, even though Amendment 17 did not explicitly refer to white farmers, its
implementation affects white farmers only and, consequently, constitutes indirect discrimination
or substantive inequality.102 It added that the differentiation of treatment meted out to the
Applicants also constitutes discrimination as the criteria for such differentiation are not
93

The SADC Tribunal consists of ten members including the President of the Tribunal appointed from SADC
Member States. See the official website at http://www.sadc-tribunal.org/index.php.
94

Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd. and Others v. The Republic of Zimbabwe, SADC (T) Case No. 2/2007 (Tshosa, J.,
dissenting). [Hereinafter Dissenting Opinion].
95

Campbell, supra note 4, at 45.
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Campbell, supra note 4, at 45ff.
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Campbell, supra note, at 48ff.
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Campbell, supra note 4, at 49-50.
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reasonable and objective but arbitrary and based primarily on considerations of race.103 The
Tribunal concluded that, implementing Amendment 17, the government of Zimbabwe has
discriminated against the Applicants on the basis of race and thereby violated its obligation under
article 6(2) of the SADC Treaty.104

B. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE
The SADC Tribunal seems to have well handled most facets of the case. It brushed a generally
limpid picture of the events that led up to the trial; it faithfully recited the procedural history of
the case as well as the submissions of the Applicants and the government of Zimbabwe. Further,
it rightly and unanimously adjudicated on the issues of its own jurisdiction to hear and determine
the case, the alleged denial of access to the courts by the Zimbabwean government and the
payment of compensation. On all those issues, the SADC Tribunal found against the
Zimbabwean government.
It is the parts of the Campbell judgment on racial discrimination and public purpose that contain
disputable assertions.

1. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

Campbell provided the Tribunal with an excellent opportunity to develop the meaning of ‘racial
discrimination’ in the SADC Treaty. At the same time, the issue of racial discrimination, the
kernel of the case, defied the SADC Tribunal as a trier of fact and as a finder of law in Campbell.
To be sure, racial discrimination was the only issue that was not unanimous as Justice
Onkemetse Tshosa dissented with good reason from the rest of his brethren. As a trier of fact, the
SADC Tribunal wrongly assumed that all the persons affected by Amendment 17 were white
Zimbabwean farmers, 105 an omission that Justice Tshosa corrected.

103

Campbell, supra note 4, at 53.

104

Id.

105

Dissenting Opinion, supra note 94, at 3-4.
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As a finder of law, the SADC Tribunal did not adequately disentangle the difficult matters of
discrimination and the racial ground of the alleged discrimination. As Justice Tshosa himself
admitted:106
I observe that during the deliberations on the case, it was not entirely clear to us how the
issue of racial discrimination would be resolved. It was only towards the end of the
deliberations, that is, a day before the judgment was to be delivered, that the majority
were inclined to hold that Amendment 17 indirectly discriminated against the applicants.
Something of a circular argument lies in the Tribunal’s finding that the Zimbabwean
government’s land resettlement program, as spelt out in Amendment 17, is racially
discriminatory because it is based on considerations of race.107 The circularity of the Tribunal’s
finding becomes obvious when one realizes that the land resettlement policy in Zimbabwe, as in
Namibia and South Africa, are redistributive and in the nature of affirmative action measures.108
In most Southern African countries that achieved independence through liberation wars, colonial
land policies and land tenure systems were the seeds of liberation struggles.109 Admittedly,
affirmative action measures intend to bring about substantive equality by differentiating on the
ground of race in order to offset the present effects of the race-based injustices of the past. A
Namibian scholar once outlined the purposes of affirmative action as implying the augmentation
of representativeness in areas dominated by the white minority and the redistribution of
wealth.110 Therefore, to say that Amendment 17 is racially discriminatory is as redundantly
repetitive as saying that affirmative action measures are founded on considerations of race.
Once it found that race-based classifications occurred in Campbell, the SADC Tribunal should
not have stopped its inquiry at that point. The next inquiry should have been whether or not the
race-based discrimination is unfair.111 South African and Namibian courts would have
investigated the fairness or otherwise of alleged discrimination.112 In foreign investment law, this
106

Dissenting Opinion, supra note 94, 1-2.

107

Campbell, supra note 4, at 53.

108
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inquiry would have turned on the question whether the alleged racial discrimination in Campbell
fell under the exception to the general prohibition on racial discrimination. This further inquiry is
necessary because not all race-conscious classifications are unfair. Indeed, some race-conscious
classifications are imperatively mandated by the ideal of equality, and rejecting rather than
accepting the imperative of race-conscious classifications would undermine people’s confidence
in that ideal.113
The SADC Tribunal did not actually embark on a full-fledged inquiry into the fairness of the
allegedly discriminatory provisions of Amendment 17. Instead, after concluding that
Amendment 17 was discriminating against the Applicants indirectly on the basis of race, Justice
Mondlane only uttered the following dictum:114
We wish to observe here that if: (a) the criteria adopted by the respondent in relation to
the land reform programme had not been arbitrary but reasonable and objective; (b) fair
compensation was paid in respect of the expropriated lands, and (c) the lands
expropriated were indeed distributed to poor, landless and other disadvantaged and
marginalized individuals or groups, rendering the purpose of the programme legitimate,
the differential treatment afforded to the Applicants would not constitute racial
discrimination.’
2. PUBLIC PURPOSE

The above dictum by Justice Mondlane reflects what went wrong with the SADC Tribunal’s
rulings on racial discrimination. First, although public purpose is a definitional element and
requirement of lawful expropriation, it does not belong to international courts like the SADC
Tribunal to pronounce themselves on the legitimacy of a sovereign state’s legislative purposes.
This is so despite the high probability that a challenge to an expropriation based on a claim that
the expropriation was not for a ‘public purpose’ would possibly be effective in the case of a
dictator, like Robert Mugabe, seizing property clearly for his or her personal use.115Second, the
compensation of parties afflicted by expropriation is a separate requirement for lawful
expropriations and not a benchmark for determining an expropriation’s public purpose or its
legitimacy.
Justice Mondlane’s third observation is more pertinent to the implementation of Amendment 17.
It is a fact that the Zimbabwean government did not distribute most lands taken from white
commercial farmers to poor, landless and other disadvantaged and marginalized Zimbabweans
but to the adherents of the ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front
113

See WOJCIEH SADURSKY, EQUALITY AND LEGITIMACY 122 (Oxford University Press 2008).
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(ZANU-PF). It is also a fact that rhetoric by Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe and most
tenors of the ruling clique has long been anti-British, if not downright racist.116
However, while these facts justify the SADC Tribunal’s finding of indirect discrimination, it
does not explain why the Tribunal declared that Amendment 17 violated Zimbabwe’s obligation
under article 6(2) of the SADC Treaty not to discriminate on the basis of race.117 The Tribunal
should have distinguished between the text of Amendment 17 and the way it was implemented
by the Zimbabwean government. After all, that is exactly what a finding of indirect
discrimination entails.118 As the Tribunal itself recognized, the text of Amendment 17 does not
expressly or explicitly refer to race, ethnicity or people of a particular origin.119
Moreover, conflating the purpose of the Zimbabwean parliament with that of the executive or the
ruling party is a long stretch because, notwithstanding the fact that legislators often dissemble,
land resettlement legislation evolved in Zimbabwe over a long period of time120 through the
countless inputs of countless individuals and different political parties with different sectional
interests. In cases where racial considerations are the only motives, the taking is clearly illegal,
like Hitler’s takings of Jewish property in Germany121 and Idi Amin’s takings of Indian property
in Uganda. But a major conundrum arises, as in Campbell, where both economic and racial
considerations motivate a taking. In such cases, it is difficult to determine which motive prevails,
‘for when economic nationalism is the reason for the taking both motives are present in equal
strength.’122 In Campbell, the Tribunal could have sorted out this intricate situation by ruling that
the enactment of Amendment 17 was not illegal while its implementation was not only illegal but
also contrary to the statutory purpose of Amendment 17.

116
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Finally, in his dissenting opinion, Justice Thosa even disputed that the discrimination was
indirectly racial and insisted that, for the purposes of Amendment 17, classifications only
targeted certain lands and not certain people:123
Amendment 17 targets agricultural land and [the Applicants] are affected not because
they are of white origin but because they are the ones who own the land in question.
Thus, the target of Amendment 17 is agricultural land not people of a particular racial
origin. This means that in implementing the Amendment it was always going to affect
those in possession of the land, be they white, black or other racial background.
In this section, the paper explained in what respects the SADC Tribunal’s holdings on racial
discrimination and public purpose were deficient. It highlighted that the SADC Tribunal could
have differentiated between the (purpose of) Amendment 17, which is legal, and the manner in
which the Zimbabwean government implemented it, which is illegal. The next part of the paper
recasts the issues and puts forth an alternative way of resolving them.

V. COMPENSATION AND UNLAWFUL NATIONALIZATIONS
If, as Justice Tshosa let out, the SADC Tribunal did not know how to go about deciding the issue
of racial discrimination, one interrogation that arises is: Why did the Tribunal not decide the case
by relying solely on the issue of compensation? The same holds true for the issue of public
purpose. Public purpose was not raised by the parties as an issue for the Tribunal’s
determination, but it was an essential part of the Tribunal’s analysis of the Applicant’s claim that
the compulsory acquisition of farmlands was based on racial discrimination. The issue of public
purpose was also an integral part of the Zimbabwean government’s counter-claim.
For an applicant to succeed on a claim of illegal expropriation, he or she needs to establish that a
respondent did not satisfy at least one of the three requirements for lawful expropriations, and
not all of them. In Funnekotter,124 the ICSID eschewed in its arbitral award the thorny questions
of public interest and racial discrimination. Rather, it decided the case solely on the basis of
compensation, ignoring the public interest and racial discrimination allegations raised by the
claimants.125

123

Dissenting Opinion, supra note 94, at 3.
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Funnekotter, supra note 9.
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Funnekotter, supra note 9, at ¶ 98: ‘The Tribunal will first examine whether or not the subparagraph (c) relating
to the provisions of a just compensation has been breached. If it arrives to the conclusion that it has, it will not be
necessary for it to consider whether, as alleged by the Claimants, the other conditions provided for in that Article or
the provisions of Article 3 have also been breached.’
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The SADC Tribunal could have settled the Campbell case by taking up the issue of
compensation exclusively, especially because of the want of conclusive evidence for a finding of
direct discrimination. The legal question would have been whether the compulsory acquisition of
the Applicants’ agricultural lands without compensation constituted an unlawful nationalization.
In addition, given the fact that the Zimbabwean government dished out the expropriated lands to
the ruling party adherents, the real question would have been whether the compulsory acquisition
of the lands without compensation resulted in confiscation.126 It appears that the facts that are
common cause in the Campbell case would tip the balance in favor of a finding of confiscation,
but the chief factor speaking against such a finding is that in modern times the term
‘confiscation’ is seldom used.127
The paper does not definitively answer these alternative questions, the main point here being that
the SADC Tribunal could have broached these controversial issues by focusing exclusively on
the requirement of compensation.

VI. CONTRIBUTION OF CAMPBELL TO EXPROPRIATION LAW
The precedental value of Campbell is equivocal on the question as to the extent to which a
country can expropriate property to correct the economic inequalities caused by colonization. On
the one hand, Campbell clearly creates an exception to the exception. It implies that, if they are
based on race and do not compensate the plaintiffs, expropriations can be illegal even if they are
part of policies aimed at redressing economic inequalities brought about by colonialism.
On the other hand, Campbell loses sight of the general exception that post-colonial
expropriations to redress economic inequalities are lawful. As a matter of principle, the failure by
the SADC Tribunal to contextualize the Zimbabwean expropriations as a form of affirmative
action policies or an exception to the general prohibition on discriminatory expropriations
contradicts foreign investment law and creates a constitutional crisis in the SADC region. Unlike
most African countries that achieved political independence in the 1960s, Zimbabwe, Namibia
and South Africa are unique on the continent in that the Black majority reclaimed political power
from the white minority fairly recently. Namibia and South Africa have provisions in their
constitutions which exempt affirmative action policies and other measures to redress past
injustices from the general prohibition on racial discrimination. The Campbell case creates a
crisis by suggesting that these policies and measures potentially or actually violate their
obligations under the SADC Treaty. The difference, however, between Zimbabwe and its
126

See Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F 2d 699 (1992)(held, the confiscation of property in that case had a
‘discriminatory motivation based on ethnicity’ and was illegal).
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M. SORNARAJAH, supra note 5, at 348: ‘In modern law…it is best to refer to takings by states as expropriation [as
opposed to confiscation], as in most instances these takings are carried out for an economic or a public purpose’.
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Namibian and Southern African counterparts is the orderly, gradual and procedurally fair process
that characterizes land redistribution in Namibia and South Africa.
On the issue of compensation, the SADC Tribunal rightly ruled that the absence of compensation
for the expropriations of white-owned farmlands rendered the expropriations unlawful.128 In so
doing, the SADC Tribunal conformed to the battered paths of international law on
expropriations.

VII. CONCLUSION
So how far can Zimbabwe or other countries take and redistribute property as part of a general
government program to redress the economic legacies of colonialism? This paper’s main
argument is that the Campbell case gives an ambiguous, equivocal answer to that question. The
value of Campbell as a precedent for these questions in foreign investment law is watered down
by the partly wrong reasoning in that case. Although the outcome of Campbell is what a proper
interpretation of the applicable law would have dictated, the process by which the Tribunal
reached this outcome is incorrect, as far as discriminatory expropriations are concerned. In that
sense, this paper is more like a concurring opinion more than a dissent from the Campbell
judgment.
Expropriations to redress past injustices are, as a matter of law, an exception to the nondiscrimination principle and thus legal. Nevertheless, the Zimbabwean land invasions are, as a
matter of fact, a violation not only of foreign investment law but also of the spirit and stated
purpose of Amendment 17.
The Campbell case could have and would have enjoyed full precedental value if it had ruled that:
• race-based expropriations are not unlawful, as a matter of principle, if they aim at
redressing the economic inequalities caused by a colonial past;

128

•

race-based expropriations to correct the effects of colonialism are an exception to the
non-discrimination principle; but

•

expropriations as an exception to the non-discrimination principle are unlawful if the
expropriating state does not pay compensation to the plaintiffs (i.e. if the expropriating
state confiscates the plaintiffs’ property).

Campbell, supra note 4, at 57.

